A Pricing Mechanism to Jointly Mitigate Market Power and Environmental Externalities in Electricity Markets
Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh,
Derek Bunn and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan Rosellon
Papers from arXiv.org
The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.
Date: 2021-04, Revised 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
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Journal Article: A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2104.00578
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