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Option to survive or surrender: carbon asset management and optimization in thermal power enterprises from China

Yue Liu, Lixin Tian, Zhuyun Xie, Zaili Zhen and Huaping Sun

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Carbon emission right allowance is a double-edged sword, one edge is to reduce emission as its original design intention, another edge has in practice slain many less developed coal-consuming enterprises, especially for those in thermal power industry. Partially governed on the hilt in hands of the authority, body of this sword is the prices of carbon emission right. How should the thermal power plants dance on the blade motivates this research. Considering the impact of price fluctuations of carbon emission right allowance, we investigate the operation of Chinese thermal power plant by modeling the decision-making with optimal stopping problem, which is established on the stochastic environment with carbon emission allowance price process simulated by geometric Brownian motion. Under the overall goal of maximizing the ultimate profitability, the optimal stopping indicates the timing of suspend or halt of production, hence the optimal stopping boundary curve implies the edge of life and death with regard to this enterprise. Applying this methodology, real cases of failure and survival of several Chinese representative thermal power plants were analyzed to explore the industry ecotope, which leads to the findings that: 1) The survival environment of existed thermal power plants becomes severer when facing more pressure from the newborn carbon-finance market. 2) Boundaries of survival environment is mainly drawn by the technical improvements for rising the utilization rate of carbon emission. Based on the same optimal stopping model, outlook of this industry is drawn with a demarcation surface defining the vivosphere of thermal power plants with different levels of profitability. This finding provides benchmarks for those enterprises struggling for survival and policy makers scheming better supervision and necessary intervene.

Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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