On the effect of social norms on performance in teams with distributed decision makers

Ravshanbek Khodzhimatov, Stephan Leitner and Friederike Wall

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Social norms are rules and standards of expected behavior that emerge in societies as a result of information exchange between agents. This paper studies the effects of emergent social norms on the performance of teams. We use the NK-framework to build an agent-based model, in which agents work on a set of interdependent tasks and exchange information regarding their past behavior with their peers. Social norms emerge from these interactions. We find that social norms come at a cost for the overall performance, unless tasks assigned to the team members are highly correlated, and the effect is stronger when agents share information regarding more tasks, but is unchanged when agents communicate with more peers. Finally, we find that the established finding that the team-based incentive schemes improve performance for highly complex tasks still holds in presence of social norms.

Date: 2021-04, Revised 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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