Optimal Design of Limited Partnership Agreements

Mohammad Abbas Rezaei

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: General partners (GP) are sometimes paid on a deal-by-deal basis and other times on a whole-portfolio basis. When is one method of payment better than the other? I show that when assets (projects or firms) are highly correlated or when GPs have low reputation, whole-portfolio contracting is superior to deal-by-deal contracting. In this case, by bundling payouts together, whole-portfolio contracting enhances incentives for GPs to exert effort. Therefore, it is better suited to alleviate the moral hazard problem which is stronger than the adverse selection problem in the case of high correlation of assets or low reputation of GPs. In contrast, for low correlation of assets or high reputation of GPs, information asymmetry concerns dominate and deal-by-deal contracts become optimal, as they can efficiently weed out bad projects one by one. These results shed light on recent empirical findings on the relationship between investors and venture capitalists.

Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ppm
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