Pareto Optimality, Functional Dependence and Collective Agency

Chenwei Shi and Yiyang Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper approaches the problem of understanding collective agency from a logical and game-theoretical perspective. Instead of collective intentionality, our analysis highlights the role of Pareto optimality. To facilitate the analysis, we propose a logic of preference and functional dependence by extending the logic of functional dependence. In this logic, we can express Pareto optimality and thus reason about collective agency.

Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2104.09112

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