Combining incentives for pollination with collective action to provide a bundle of ecosystem services in farmland

Jerome Faure, Lauriane Mouysset and Sabrina Gaba

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A polycentric approach to ecosystem service (ES) governance that combines individual incentives for interdependent ES providers with collective action is a promising lever to overcome the decline in ES and generate win-win solutions in agricultural landscapes. In this study, we explored the effectiveness of such an approach by focusing on incentives for managed pollination targeting either beekeepers or farmers who were either in communication with each other or not. We used a stylized bioeconomic model to simulate (i) the mutual interdependency through pollination in intensive agricultural landscapes and (ii) the economic and ecological impacts of introducing two beekeeping subsidies and one pesticide tax. The findings showed that incentives generated a spillover effect, affecting not only targeted stakeholders but non-targeted stakeholders as well as the landscape, and that this effect was amplified by communication. However, none of the simulated types of polycentric ES governance proved sustainable overall: subsidies showed excellent economic but low environmental performance, while the tax led to economic losses but was beneficial for the landscape. Based on these results, we identified three conditions for sustainable ES governance based on communication between stakeholders and incentives: (i) strong mutual interdependency (i.e. few alternatives exist for stakeholders), (ii) the benefits of communication outweigh the costs, and (iii) the incentivized ES drivers are not detrimental to other ES. Further research is needed to systematize which combination of individual payments and collaboration are sustainable in which conditions.

Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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