How the 'Auction Cube' Supports the Selection of Auction Designs in Industrial Procurement

Gregor Berz, Florian Rupp and Brian Sieben

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: It is well known that rightly applied reverse auctions offer big commercial potential to procurement departments. However, the sheer number of auction types often overwhelms users in practice. And since the implications of a wrongly chosen auction type are equally well known, the overall usage of reverse auctions lacks its potential significantly. In this paper, a novel method is being proposed that guides the user in selecting the right combination of basic auction forms for single lot events, considering both market-, as well as supplier-related, bijective criteria.

Date: 2021-05, Revised 2021-05
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