Sustainability of Collusion and Market Transparency in a Sequential Search Market: a Generalization

Jacopo De Tullio and Giuseppe Puleio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The present work generalizes the analytical results of Petrikaite (2016) to a market where more than two firms interact. As a consequence, for a generic number of firms in the oligopoly model described by Janssen et al (2005), the relationship between the critical discount factor which sustains the monopoly collusive allocation and the share of perfectly informed buyers is non-monotonic, reaching a unique internal point of minimum. The first section locates the work within the proper economic framework. The second section hosts the analytical computations and the mathematical reasoning needed to derive the desired generalization, which mainly relies on the Leibniz rule for the differentiation under the integral sign and the Bounded Convergence Theorem.

Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.02094 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2105.02094

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().