Dynamic Choices and Common Learning

Rahul Deb and Ludovic Renou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the time-varying state from the same information and their actions change because of the evolving common belief. The researcher does not observe agents' preferences, the prior, the common information and the stochastic process for the state. We characterize the set of choices that are rationalized by this model and generalize the information environments to allow for private information. We discuss the implications of our results for uncovering discrimination and committee decision making.

Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Dynamic Choice and Common Learning (2021)
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