When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers

Kiho Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the problem of when to sell an indivisible object. There is a monopolistic seller who owns an indivisible object and plans to sell it over a given span of time to the set of potential buyers whose valuations for the object evolve over time. We formulate the seller's problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. We provide a procedure for finding the optimal solution and show how to check incentive compatibility. We also discuss the threshold rule from the perspective of optimal stopping.

Date: 2021-05, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-mic
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