Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains

Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng

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Abstract: We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the "extremes" and unrestricted in the "middle". We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).

Date: 2021-05, Revised 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains (2022)
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