The Giving Game

Peter Weijland

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper describes a basic model of a gift economy in the shape of a Giving Game and reveals the fundamental structure of such a game. Main result is that the game shows a community effect in that a small subgroup of players eventually keeps all circulating goods for themselves. Example applications are where computers are sharing processing power for complex calculations, or when commodity traders are making transactions in some professional community. The Giving Game may equally well be viewed as a basic model of clientelism or corruption. Keywords in this paper are giving, gift economy, community effect, stabilization, computational complexity, corruption, micro-economics, game theory, stock trading, distributed computing, crypto currency, blockchain.

Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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