$N$-player and Mean-field Games in It\^{o}-diffusion Markets with Competitive or Homophilous Interaction

Ruimeng Hu and Thaleia Zariphopoulou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In It\^{o}-diffusion environments, we introduce and analyze $N$-player and common-noise mean-field games in the context of optimal portfolio choice in a common market. The players invest in a finite horizon and also interact, driven either by competition or homophily. We study an incomplete market model in which the players have constant individual risk tolerance coefficients (CARA utilities). We also consider the general case of random individual risk tolerances and analyze the related games in a complete market setting. This randomness makes the problem substantially more complex as it leads to ($N$ or a continuum of) auxiliary ''individual'' It\^{o}-diffusion markets. For all cases, we derive explicit or closed-form solutions for the equilibrium stochastic processes, the optimal state processes, and the values of the games.

Date: 2021-06, Revised 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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