Truthful Self-Play

Shohei Ohsawa

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning in non-cooperative partially observable environments with communication due to information asymmetry. Our proposed framework is a simple modification of self-play inspired by mechanism design, also known as {\em reverse game theory}, to elicit truthful signals and make the agents cooperative. The key idea is to add imaginary rewards using the peer prediction method, i.e., a mechanism for evaluating the validity of information exchanged between agents in a decentralized environment. Numerical experiments with predator prey, traffic junction and StarCraft tasks demonstrate that the state-of-the-art performance of our framework.

Date: 2021-06, Revised 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp and nep-gth
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Published in The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR2023)

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