Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction

Kiho Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic mechanism problem. We next examine efficient dynamic mechanisms: We establish the uniqueness of Groves mechanism and investigate budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism in some detail for a bilateral trading environment. This introduction reveals that many results and techniques of static mechanism design can be straightforwardly extended and adapted to the analysis of dynamic settings.

Date: 2021-06
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Published in JETEM 32(2), June 2021, pp. 92-121

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