Unique Stable Matchings

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings, that can be obtained using procedures introduced in Irving and Leather (1986) and Balinski and Ratier (1997). The following three statements are equivalent (a) P has a unique stable matching. (b) Preferences on P* are acyclic, as defined by Chung (2000). (c) In P* every market participant's preference list is a singleton.

Date: 2021-06, Revised 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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