Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis

Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel and Noam Nisan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a "Pigouvian" tax may also induce other, socially inefficient, equilibria. We observe that this social inefficiency may be unbounded, and study whether alternative tax structures may lead to milder losses in the worst case, i.e. to a lower price of anarchy. We show that no tax structure leads to bounded losses in the worst case. However, we do find a tax scheme that has a lower price of anarchy than the Pigouvian tax, obtaining tight lower and upper bounds in terms of a crucial parameter that we identify. We generalize our results to various scenarios that each offers an alternative to the use of a public road by private cars, such as ride sharing, or using a bus or a train.

Date: 2021-07, Revised 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth, nep-isf, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-tre
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