Stable and extremely unequal

Alfred Galichon, Octavia Ghelfi and Marc Henry

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.

Date: 2021-08, Revised 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-isf and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economics Letters, 2023

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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.06587 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stable and Extremely Unequal (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2108.06587

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