Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

Saurav Goyal and Aroon Narayanan

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Abstract: We characterize ex-post implementable allocation rules for single object auctions under quasi-linear preferences with convex interdependent value functions. We show that requiring ex-post implementability is equivalent to requiring that the allocation rule must satisfy a condition that we call eventual monotonicity (EM), which is a weakening of monotonicity, a familiar condition used to characterize dominant strategy implementation.

Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-isf and nep-mic
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