Estimating Endogenous Coalitional Mergers: Merger Costs and Assortativeness of Size and Specialization

Suguru Otani

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I present a structural empirical model of a one-sided one-to-many matching with complementarities to quantify the effect of subsidy design on endogenous merger matching. I investigate shipping mergers and consolidations in Japan in 1964. At the time, 95 firms formed six large groups. I find that the existence of unmatched firms enables us to recover merger costs, and the importance of technological diversification varies across carrier and firm types. The counterfactual simulations show that 20 \% of government subsidy expenditures could have been cut. The government could have possibly changed the equilibrium number of groups to between one and six.

Date: 2021-08, Revised 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-isf
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