Fuzzy Conventions

Marcin P\k{e}ski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study binary coordination games with random utility played in networks. A typical equilibrium is fuzzy -- it has positive fractions of agents playing each action. The set of average behaviors that may arise in an equilibrium typically depends on the network. The largest set (in the set inclusion sense) is achieved by a network that consists of a large number of copies of a large complete graph. The smallest set (in the set inclusion sense) is achieved on a lattice-type network. It consists of a single outcome that corresponds to a novel version of risk dominance that is appropriate for games with random utility.

Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-isf, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.13474 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2108.13474

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().