Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests

Mark Whitmeyer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission fee is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission fee or the lowest submission fee is optimal.

Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-rmg and nep-spo
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