Persuasion and Welfare

Laura Doval and Alex Smolin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Bayes welfare set, consisting of the population's utility profiles that are feasible under some information policy. The Pareto frontier of this set can be recovered by a series of standard Bayesian persuasion problems, in which a utilitarian planner takes the role of the information designer. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an information policy exists that Pareto dominates the no-information policy. We illustrate our results with applications to data leakage, price discrimination, and credit ratings.

Date: 2021-09, Revised 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-isf and nep-mic
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.03061 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Persuasion and Welfare (2024)
Working Paper: Persuasion and Welfare (2024)
Working Paper: Persuasion and Welfare (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2109.03061

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