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Prosecutor Politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration

Chika O. Okafor

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Abstract: Exploiting variation in the timing of district attorney elections across nearly 40 states during the steepest rise in U.S. incarceration (roughly 1986-2006), this paper shows that election years increased per capita admissions and months sentenced to state prisons, with admissions rising 3 percent--approximately 63,000 additional prison admissions over the period. These effects were concentrated in the South, stronger in Republican counties, and declined as public opinion softened, largely disappearing after the era ended. Results suggest sentencing outcomes respond to voter preferences, implying that the politics underlying rising incarceration may be as important to understand as the policies themselves.

Date: 2021-10, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Chika O. Okafor. 2026. Prosecutor politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 262, 105777

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