Evolutionary Foundation for Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion

Yuval Heller and Ilan Nehama

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of aggregate risk. We show that the choices that maximize the long-run growth rate are induced by a heterogeneous population in which the least and most risk-averse agents are indifferent between facing an aggregate risk and obtaining its linear and harmonic mean for sure, respectively. Moreover, approximately optimal behavior can be induced by a simple distribution according to which all agents have constant relative risk aversion, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is uniformly distributed between zero and two.

Date: 2021-10, Revised 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cwa, nep-evo, nep-rmg and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory (JET), 2023, virtual special issue on evolutionary game theory

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Working Paper: Evolutionary Foundation for Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2110.11245

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