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A study on bribery networks with a focus on harassment bribery and ways to control corruption

Chanchal Pramanik

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Abstract: The paper focuses on the bribery network emphasizing harassment bribery. A bribery network ends with the police officer whose utility from the bribe is positive and the approving officer in the network. The persistent nature of corruption is due to colluding behavior of the bribery networks. The probability of detection of bribery incidents will help in improving controlling corruption in society. The asymmetric form of punishment and award equivalent to the amount of punishment to the network can enhance the probability of detection of harassment bribery $(p_{h})$ and thus increasing the probability of detection of overall bribery $(p_{h} \in p)$.

Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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