Homophily in preferences or meetings? Identifying and estimating an iterative network formation model

Luis Alvarez, Cristine Pinto and Vladimir Ponczek

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Abstract: Is homophily in social and economic networks driven by a taste for homogeneity (preferences) or by a higher probability of meeting individuals with similar attributes (opportunity)? This paper studies identification and estimation of an iterative network game that distinguishes between these two mechanisms. Our approach enables us to assess the counterfactual effects of changing the meeting protocol between agents. As an application, we study the role of preferences and meetings in shaping classroom friendship networks in Brazil. In a network structure in which homophily due to preferences is stronger than homophily due to meeting opportunities, tracking students may improve welfare. Still, the relative benefit of this policy diminishes over the school year.

Date: 2022-01, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2201.06694

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