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Who Increases Emergency Department Use? New Insights from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment

Augustine Denteh and Helge Liebert

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide new insights regarding the headline result that Medicaid increased emergency department (ED) use from the Oregon experiment. We find meaningful heterogeneous impacts of Medicaid on ED use using causal machine learning methods. The individualized treatment effect distribution includes a wide range of negative and positive values, suggesting the average effect masks substantial heterogeneity. A small group-about 14% of participants-in the right tail of the distribution drives the overall effect. We identify priority groups with economically significant increases in ED usage based on demographics and previous utilization. Intensive margin effects are an important driver of increases in ED utilization.

Date: 2022-01, Revised 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-ias
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.07072 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Who Increases Emergency Department Use? New Insights from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Who Increases Emergency Department Use? New Insights from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Who Increases Emergency Department Use? New Insights from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (2022) Downloads
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