The Benefits of Coarse Preferences

Joseph Y. Halpern, Yuval Heller and Eyal Winter ()

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equilibrium (CUE) requires that (1) each player maximizes her coarse utility, given the opponent's strategy, and (2) the classifications form best replies to one another. We characterize CUEs in various games. In particular, we show that there is a qualitative difference between CUEs in which only one of the players clusters payoffs, and those in which all players cluster their payoffs, and that the latter type induce players to treat co-players better than in Nash equilibria in the large class of games with monotone externalities.

Date: 2022-01, Revised 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.10141 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Benefits of Coarse Preferences (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2201.10141

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().