Optimal Support for Distressed Subsidiaries -- a Systemic Risk Perspective

Maxim Bichuch and Nils Detering

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a network of bank holdings, where every holding has two subsidiaries of different types. A subsidiary can trade with another holding's subsidiary of the same type. Holdings support their subsidiaries up to a certain level when they would otherwise fail to honor their financial obligations. We investigate the spread of contagion in this banking network when the number of bank holdings is large, and find the final number of defaulted subsidiaries under different rules for the holding support. We also consider resilience of this multilayered network to small shocks. Our work sheds light onto the role that holding structures can play in the amplification of financial stress. We find that depending on the capitalization of the network, a holding structure can be beneficial as compared to smaller separated entities. In other instances, it can be harmful and actually increase contagion. We illustrate our results in a numerical case study and also determine the optimal level of holding support from a regulator perspective.

Date: 2022-01, Revised 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
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