Default Supply Auctions in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Proposals

Juan Ignacio Pe\~na and Rosa Rodriguez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies premiums got by winning bidders in default supply auctions, and speculation and hedging activities in power derivatives markets in dates near auctions. Data includes fifty-six auction prices from 2007 to 2013, those of CESUR in the Spanish OMEL electricity market, and those of Basic Generation Service auctions (PJM-BGS) in New Jersey's PJM market. Winning bidders got an average ex-post yearly forward premium of 7% (CESUR) and 38% (PJM-BGS). The premium using an index of futures prices is 1.08% (CESUR) and 24% (PJM-BGS). Ex-post forward premium is negatively related to the number of bidders and spot price volatility. In CESUR, hedging-driven trading in power derivatives markets predominates around auction dates, but in PJM-BGS, speculation-driven trading prevails.

Date: 2022-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2202.01743

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