On the Asymptotic Performance of Affirmative Actions in School Choice

Di Feng and Yun Liu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper analyzes the asymptotic performance of two popular affirmative action policies, majority quota and minority reserve, under the immediate acceptance mechanism (IAM) and the top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in the contest of school choice. The matching outcomes of these two affirmative actions are asymptotically equivalent under the IAM when all students are sincere. Given the possible preference manipulations under the IAM, we characterize the asymptotically equivalent sets of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the IAM with these two affirmative actions. However, these two affirmative actions induce different matching outcomes under the TTCM with non-negligible probability even in large markets.

Date: 2022-02, Revised 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2202.03927

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