The Evolution of Blockchain: from Lit to Dark

Agostino Capponi, Ruizhe Jia and Ye Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Transactions submitted through the blockchain peer-to-peer (P2P) network may leak out exploitable information. We study the economic incentives behind the adoption of blockchain dark venues, where users' transactions are observable only by miners on these venues. We show that miners may not fully adopt dark venues to preserve rents extracted from arbitrageurs, hence creating execution risk for users. The dark venue neither eliminates frontrunning risk nor reduces transaction costs. It strictly increases the payoff of miners, weakly increases the payoff of users, and weakly reduces arbitrageurs' profits. We provide empirical support for our main implications, and show that they are economically significant. A 1% increase in the probability of being frontrun raises users' adoption rate of the dark venue by 0.6%. Arbitrageurs' cost-to-revenue ratio increases by a third with a dark venue.

Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-pay
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