Preference Learning in School Choice Problems

SangMok Lee

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We study a school choice model where students can obtain information about their preferences by incurring a cost. We demonstrate greater homogeneity in rank-order reports and reduced information acquisition under the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism, resulting in an increased reliance on random tie-breaking and ultimately inefficient outcomes. Thus, it is critical for the DA mechanism to have easy access to school information in order to maintain its efficiency.

Date: 2022-02, Revised 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-des and nep-ure
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