A general characterization of optimal tie-breaker designs

Harrison H. Li and Art B. Owen

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Abstract: Tie-breaker designs trade off a statistical design objective with short-term gain from preferentially assigning a binary treatment to those with high values of a running variable $x$. The design objective is any continuous function of the expected information matrix in a two-line regression model, and short-term gain is expressed as the covariance between the running variable and the treatment indicator. We investigate how to specify design functions indicating treatment probabilities as a function of $x$ to optimize these competing objectives, under external constraints on the number of subjects receiving treatment. Our results include sharp existence and uniqueness guarantees, while accommodating the ethically appealing requirement that treatment probabilities are non-decreasing in $x$. Under such a constraint, there always exists an optimal design function that is constant below and above a single discontinuity. When the running variable distribution is not symmetric or the fraction of subjects receiving the treatment is not $1/2$, our optimal designs improve upon a $D$-optimality objective without sacrificing short-term gain, compared to the three level tie-breaker designs of Owen and Varian (2020) that fix treatment probabilities at $0$, $1/2$, and $1$. We illustrate our optimal designs with data from Head Start, an early childhood government intervention program.

Date: 2022-02, Revised 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm and nep-exp
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