Speculation in Procurement Auctions

Shanglyu Deng

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates a positive expected profit in second-price auctions but could be unprofitable in first-price auctions. In the case where speculation is profitable in first-price auctions, it is more profitable in second-price auctions. This comparison in profitability is driven by different competition patterns in the two auction mechanisms. In terms of welfare, speculation causes private value destruction and harms efficiency. Sellers benefit from the acquisition offer made by the speculator. Therefore, speculation comes at the expense of the auctioneer.

Date: 2022-03, Revised 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Speculation in procurement auctions (2023)
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