Grandes fraudes y gobiernos corporativos en la Econom\'ia desde mediados del siglo XX

I Mart\'in-de-Santos

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The international financial system is currently not yet prepared to face a foreseeable crisis mainly motivated by the dichotomy between the real economy and the virtual economy. Skepticism is widespread even when it comes to investments in sustainable economy. The concentration of capital in a few persons is one of the greatest risks for the possible reiteration of economic crises. The benevolent sentences of the courts to some of the fraudsters do not contribute to dispelling the ghost of fraud nor to the disappearance of tax havens. From the diachronic perspective, it is observed that economic crises are increasingly frequent and incidents always in the financial field; which forces us to rethink an economic model on an international scale in which there is a greater weight of the economic policy of governments over the power of multinational companies in the context of globalization. In the context of Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance is listed as one of the fundamental levers to curb large business fraud, but its efficiency seems insufficient due to the lack of international regulations and the ignorance of hidden forces in what has been known as fiscal and financial engineering. The application of liberal policies in an unorthodox way is causing real social gaps in the distribution of income and is undermining the current capitalist system. The need to implement corporate governments is recommended as one of the essential formulas for sustaining the international economic system.

Date: 2022-02
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