Information Preferences of Individual Agents in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Network Games

Furkan Sezer and Ceyhun Eksin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity of information revealed to the agents about the payoff state to maximize the social welfare. Prior results show that full information disclosure is optimal under certain assumptions on the payoffs, i.e., it is beneficial for the average individual. In this paper, we provide conditions based on the strength of the dependence of payoffs on neighbors' actions, i.e., competition, under which a rational agent is expected to benefit, i.e., receive higher payoffs, from full information disclosure. We find that all agents benefit from information disclosure for the star network structure when the game is symmetric and submodular or supermodular. We also identify that the central agent benefits more than a peripheral agent from full information disclosure unless the competition is strong and the number of peripheral agents is small enough. Despite the fact that all agents expect to benefit from information disclosure ex-ante, a central agent can be worse-off from information disclosure in many realizations of the payoff state under strong competition, indicating that a risk-averse central agent can prefer uninformative signals ex-ante.

Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ore
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