Bribes to Miners: Evidence from Ethereum

Xiaotong Sun

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In blockchain, bribery is an inevitable problem since users with various goals can bribe miners by transferring cryptoassets. To alleviate the negative effects of such collusion, Ethereum blockchain implemented new transaction fee mechanism in the London Fork, which was deployed on August 5th, 2021. In this paper, we first filter potential bribery by scanning Ethereum transactions, and the potential bribers and bribees are centralized in a small group. Then we construct bribing proxies to measure the active level of bribery and then investigate the effects of bribery. Consequently, bribery can influence both Ethereum and other mainstream blockchains, in aspects of underlying cryptocurrency, transaction statistics, and network adoption. Moreover, the London Fork shows complicated effects on relationship between bribery and blockchain factors. Besides, bribery in Ethereum relates to stock markets, e.g., S&P 500 and Nasdaq, implying implicit interlinks between blockchain and traditional finance.

Date: 2022-03, Revised 2022-06
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