Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games

Suguru Otani

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms makes it possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market.

Date: 2022-04, Revised 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
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