On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations

Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing the weighted product of the agents' utilities. We show that when agents have binary valuations, a specific version of MWNW is resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time.

Date: 2022-04, Revised 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 117:101-108 (2022)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.03803 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2204.03803

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().