A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation

Jian Low, Chen Hajaj and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

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Abstract: We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game.

Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2204.04251

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