Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities
Papers from arXiv.org
A main issue in improving public sector efficiency is to understand to what extent public appointments are based on worker capability, instead of being used to reward political supporters (patronage). I contribute to a recent literature documenting patronage in public sector employment by establishing what type of workers benefit the most from political connections. Under the (empirically supported) assumption that in close elections the result of the election is as good as random, I estimate a causal forest to identify heterogeneity in the conditional average treatment effect of being affiliated to the party of the winning mayor. Contrary to previous literature, for most positions we find positive selection on education, but a negative selection on (estimated) ability. Overall, unemployed workers or low tenure employees that are newly affiliated to the winning candidate's party benefit the most from political connections, suggesting that those are used for patronage.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.09450 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2204.09450
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().