Improved Approximation to First-Best Gains-from-Trade

Yumou Fei

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can achieve this without violating one of the Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual rationality and weakly balanced budget conditions. This motivates the study of approximating the trade-whenever-socially-beneficial mechanism, in terms of the expected gains-from-trade. Recently, Deng, Mao, Sivan, and Wang showed that the random-offerer mechanism achieves at least a 1/8.23 approximation. We improve this lower bound to 1/3.15 in this paper. We also determine the exact worst-case approximation ratio of the seller-pricing mechanism assuming the distribution of the buyer's value satisfies the monotone hazard rate property.

Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-int and nep-mic
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