Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences

Chao Huang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.

Date: 2022-05, Revised 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-reg
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