Impossibility of Collective Intelligence

Krikamol Muandet

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Democratization of AI involves training and deploying machine learning models across heterogeneous and potentially massive environments. Diversity of data opens up a number of possibilities to advance AI systems, but also introduces pressing concerns such as privacy, security, and equity that require special attention. This work shows that it is theoretically impossible to design a rational learning algorithm that has the ability to successfully learn across heterogeneous environments, which we decoratively call collective intelligence (CI). By representing learning algorithms as choice correspondences over a hypothesis space, we are able to axiomatize them with essential properties. Unfortunately, the only feasible algorithm compatible with all of the axioms is the standard empirical risk minimization (ERM) which learns arbitrarily from a single environment. Our impossibility result reveals informational incomparability between environments as one of the foremost obstacles for researchers who design novel algorithms that learn from multiple environments, which sheds light on prerequisites for success in critical areas of machine learning such as out-of-distribution generalization, federated learning, algorithmic fairness, and multi-modal learning.

Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp and nep-dem
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