Some Optimisation Problems in Insurance with a Terminal Distribution Constraint

Katia Colaneri, Julia Eisenberg and Benedetta Salterini

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Abstract: In this paper, we study two optimisation settings for an insurance company, under the constraint that the terminal surplus at a deterministic and finite time $T$ follows a normal distribution with a given mean and a given variance. In both cases, the surplus of the insurance company is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. First, we allow the insurance company to pay dividends and seek to maximise the expected discounted dividend payments or to minimise the ruin probability under the terminal distribution constraint. Here, we find explicit expressions for the optimal strategies in both cases: in discrete and continuous time settings. Second, we let the insurance company buy a reinsurance contract for a pool of insured or a branch of business. To achieve a certain level of sustainability (i.e. the collected premia should be sufficient to buy reinsurance and to pay the occurring claims) the initial capital is set to be zero. We only allow for piecewise constant reinsurance strategies producing a normally distributed terminal surplus, whose mean and variance lead to a given Value at Risk or Expected Shortfall at some confidence level $\alpha$. We investigate the question which admissible reinsurance strategy produces a smaller ruin probability, if the ruin-checks are due at discrete deterministic points in time.

Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-ias and nep-rmg
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