EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games

Annick Laruelle and Andr\'e Rocha

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show that there exists symmetric Nash equilibria in which players discriminate by acting differently according to the type of opponent that they face in anti-coordination games, while no such equilibrium exists in coordination games. Moreover, discrimination has a limit: the maximum number of groups where the treatment differs is three. We then discuss the theoretical results in light of the observed behavior of people in some specific psychological contexts.

Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.05087 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2206.05087

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-02
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2206.05087