Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism

Peter Troyan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule.

Date: 2022-06, Revised 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2024), 113:103015

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2206.11359

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