Optimal Verification of Rumors in Networks

Luca Merlino and Nicole Tabasso

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher rumor prevalence can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow rumors to circulate if: verification overcomes ignorance of messages, transmission of information is relatively low, and the planner's budget to induce verification is neither too low nor too high.

Date: 2022-07, Revised 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-net
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